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Abstract 
 
The amalgamation of Medical Internet of Things 
(MIoT) devices into everyday life is influencing the 
landscape of modern medicine. The implementation of 
these devices potentially alleviates the pressures and 
physical demands of healthcare systems through the 
remote monitoring of patients. However, there are 
concerns that the emergence of MIoT ecosystems is 
introducing an assortment of security and privacy 
challenges. While previous research has shown that 
multiple vulnerabilities exist within MIoT devices, 
minimal research investigates potential data leakage 
from MIoT devices through hijacking attacks.  
The research contribution of this paper is twofold. 
First, it provides a proof of concept that certain MIoT 
devices and their accompanying smartphone 
applications are vulnerable to hijacking attacks. 
Second, it highlights the effectiveness of using digital 
forensics tools as a lens to identify patient and medical 
device information on a hijacker’s smartphone.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The integration of wireless communication 
capabilities is dramatically influencing the landscape 
of modern medicine. This evolution is introducing 
medical devices that will operate more efficiently, 
safely, and securely over wireless networks [1]. Recent 
studies by the European Commission and IBM 
estimate that within the next decade, over 50 billion 
medical devices will be Internet capable [2, 3]. 
Coupling this information with industry predictions 
indicating that 49% of individuals own a wearable 
device, supports the idea that individuals are 
increasingly interested in monitoring their health, 
medical, and dietary practices [4, 5]. 
While Medical Internet of Things (MIoT) devices 
are often for personal use, they are also useful in larger 
medical environments [6]. Within hospitals, these 
devices can record and collect patient data and 
integrate these measurements into Electronic Health 
Records (EHRs). Hence, both individual and hospital 
MIoT devices potentially produce and collect vast 
amounts of medical and patient information. For 
example, an Internet-enabled next-generation ventilator 
is expected to generate almost 305 data parameters per 
second [7, 8]. As a result of these predictions, a 
Stanford Medicine report goes on to estimate that the 
medical industry will generate 2,314 exabytes of data 
by 2020 [9].  
However, this data explosion in medical 
environments also introduces an assortment of security 
and privacy challenges, from both industry and 
academic perspectives. Patient information, therapy 
details, and device operation metadata generated and 
collected by MIoT devices are all considered to be 
private information according to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
[10]. As a result, the Security and Privacy Rules within 
HIPAA specify that entities “maintain appropriate 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for 
protecting electronic Patient Health Information 
(ePHI)” [11, 12]. HIPAA additionally states that 
entities are required to “preserve the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of collected ePHI data, as 
well as protecting against malicious users and 
unauthorized disclosures” [10]. 
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Many MIoT devices also interface to a smartphone 
application. This application allows users to track 
personal and medical information communications 
with a MIoT device. However, previous research 
demonstrates that smartphones and their accompanying 
applications can contain user-related residual data [13-
17]. From the perspective of a medical device, research 
indicates that smartphone residual data can be used to 
identify metadata related to a specific patient and their 
interactions with the medical device itself [18]. Further 
complicating matters, researchers have established that 
residual artifacts generated by smartphone applications 
can be used to identify broad user behavior         
patterns [19].  
Current research also indicates that medical devices 
are susceptible to cleartext network transmissions, 
often without leaving a trace [20, 21]. The marriage of 
smartphone applications with MIoT devices, coupled 
with both the growing volume of data and the 
identified security and privacy concerns prompts the 
idea that these devices are vulnerable to hijacking 
attacks. This idea prompted the hypothesis that MIoT 
devices are susceptive to hijacking attacks, through 
their accompanying smartphone applications. This 
hypothesis also raises the following supplementary 
research questions: 
• Does a hijacking attack generate recoverable 
residual data? 
• If so, is it possible to recover MIoT device 
readings from a hijacking attack involving the 
device? 
• If residual data does exist, is it possible for an 
attacker to identify a specific individual using 
information from a hijacking attack?  
The contribution of this research is twofold. First, it 
provides a proof of concept that certain MIoT devices 
and their accompanying smartphone applications are 
vulnerable to hijacking attacks. Second, it highlights 
the effectiveness of using digital forensics tools as a 
lens to identify patient and medical device information 
on a hijacker’s smartphone. The balance of the paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work, 
and Section 3 presents the methodology employed in 
this research. Section 4 presents the results and a 
discussion of these results. Section 5 derives 
conclusions and presents ideas for future research. 
 
Related Work 
 
The continuous integration of technology in 
medical settings is creating an environment where 
medical devices are potentially at risk from a security 
perspective [22]. Complicating matters, research 
indicates that residual data from mobile and GPS 
devices are used in civil and criminal legal contexts 
and that there are legal issues around conducting cloud 
investigations [23-25]. The potential critical impact on 
human life, coupled with legal implications, 
encourages discussions by researchers on the   security 
implications of technology in hospital        
environments [26-28]. Malasri and Wang [26] argue 
that implantable medical devices, such as pacemakers, 
are susceptible to a variety of attacks, including 
eavesdropping, patient tracking, and spoofing. For 
example, an individual could send malicious 
commands to compromise the security of a pacemaker, 
causing direct physical harm to an individual [26]. 
Glisson et al. [27] demonstrate how a medical 
mannequin, within a hospital environment, could be 
vulnerable to denial of service and brute force attacks. 
Li et al. [28] focus their research on diabetes therapy 
devices. These researchers argue that some devices 
transmit patient and device information in plaintext, 
including passwords and dosage information.  
The emergence of Medical Internet of Things 
(MIoT) ecosystems is expected to introduce several 
benefits and opportunities for the medical and 
healthcare communities [29-33]. MIoT devices are 
defined as “a group of devices connected to the 
Internet, to perform the processes and services required 
to support healthcare” [34]. Baker et al. [29] claim that 
MIoT devices provide a potential solution that 
alleviates pressures and physical demands on 
healthcare systems through the remote monitoring of 
patients. For instance, MIoT devices could monitor 
patients in remote and rural areas, as well as elderly 
patients, from the comfort of their home [29].  
Dimitrov [31] contends that deploying MIoT 
devices to patients allows medical practitioners to 
provide personalized and customized treatment plans. 
Separately, medical researchers contend that providing 
anxious patients with MIoT devices, for home use, 
could provide more accurate and reliable medical 
results [30, 32, 33]. 
While the benefits of deploying MIoT devices are 
clear, there are concerns that patient and medical 
information could be vulnerable to attack by malicious 
users. This concern is particularly true when MIoT 
devices are used in environments where it is difficult to 
control the underlying network, such as a public Wi-Fi 
hotspot [34]. Williams and McCauley [35] add that 
because MIoT devices collect large amounts of 
personal and health information, these devices are 
more likely to be targeted by malicious users and 
cybercriminals. The collection of vast amounts of data 
introduces the threat of cross-linking information and 
subsequently using this information to draw 
conclusions about a patient [35]. Hence, several 
researchers have focused their efforts on examining the 
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security and privacy challenges that emerge from the 
deployment of MIoT devices in both hospital and 
home settings [20, 21, 36-39].  
Lotfy and Hale [38] studied the data exchange 
mechanisms used within various health wearable 
devices, from a security perspective. The focus of the 
study was to investigate the Bluetooth Low Energy 
(BLE) pairing strategies in three devices, a Jawbone, a 
Pebble Watch, and a Fitbit. Their results show that 
while manufacturers claim that their pairing strategies 
are secure, vulnerabilities exist that could result in 
man-in-the-middle attacks. 
Fereidooni et al. [37] focused their efforts on the 
security of seventeen fitness tracking products. Their 
attack focuses on the data exchanged between the 
fitness tracker’s smartphone applications and the 
manufacturer's cloud service. These researchers 
successfully demonstrated how a malicious user could 
inject fabricated data into spoofed medical activity 
records [37]. 
Alisgari et al. [36] examined security weaknesses in 
mobile health smartphone applications, which are often 
used together with MIoT devices. This analysis 
investigated the use of the Transport Layer Security 
protocol in twenty-five mobile health applications. 
Alisgari et al. [36] reported that twenty-one out of the 
twenty-five applications were susceptible to man-in-
the-middle attacks. Moreover, the results of the 
analysis revealed that twelve applications leaked the 
user password during network transmissions.  
Wood et al. [20] investigated an attacker’s ability to 
intercept MIoT data transmissions, and to then use this 
information to build a profile of the user. This analysis 
focused on analyzing network packets transmitted by 
four MIoT devices. The results showed that 
information captured from one of the devices included 
sensitive user information, which would allow an 
attacker to determine not just that the user measured 
their blood pressure, but also how frequently the user 
was taking these measurements. While the packet 
analysis does not identify individual names, a unique 
user identifier was recognized during the analysis of 
the packet transmission [20]. 
Classen et al. [21] analyzed the entire Fitbit eco-
system, including its smartphone application, the Fitbit 
cloud, and the Fitbit’s device firmware. Through their 
analysis of these technologies, Classen et al. [21] 
explained that multiple vulnerabilities exist, which 
could impact a user’s privacy and the security of their 
information. To mitigate these concerns, Classen et al. 
[21] suggested that Fitbit implement security by design 
principles and stronger encryption on the smartphone 
application.  
Siddiqi et al. [39] focused on timestamps and their 
vulnerability to modification in MIoT devices. The 
authors demonstrated how an attacker could, 
potentially, intercept and modify medical and patient 
information, before it is stored in the cloud. This 
includes timestamp information, which would allow an 
attacker to backfill medical data and commit insurance 
fraud [39]. While previous research has examined a 
variety of security vulnerabilities in MIoT devices, 
minimal research investigates the ability for an 
individual to undertake a hijacking attack using a 
smartphone application and its corresponding MIoT 
device. 
 
3. Experiment Design  
 
To investigate the hypothesis and associated 
research questions identified in the introduction, a 
controlled experiment was conducted as described by 
Oates [40]. The controlled experiment consisted of 
eight stages. The eight stages included: 1) preparing 
the victim smartphones, installing the Medical Internet 
of Things (MIoT) device smartphone applications, as 
well as creating test accounts for use in the experiment; 
2) synchronizing the MIoT devices with the victim 
smartphones and then powering down these 
smartphones; 3) using the MIoT devices; 4) preparing 
a hijacker smartphone device, installing the MIoT 
device smartphone applications and setting up a test 
account; 5) executing the MIoT smartphone 
applications on the hijacker smartphone and attempting 
to obtain offline readings from the MIoT devices; 6) 
conducting a manual examination of the hijacker 
smartphone; 7) processing the hijacker smartphone 
using MicroSystemation (MSAB) XRY to create an 
extraction dump; 8) using forensic tools to extract files 
and artifacts from the extraction dump. 
The smartphones utilized in this experiment include 
a Samsung Galaxy S6 and an Apple iPhone SE 
(hereafter referred to as the victim smartphones) and a 
Samsung Galaxy S4 (hereafter referred to as the 
hijacker smartphone). Table 1 - Smartphone Devices 
presents an overview of these devices, their features, 
and storage capabilities. 
 
Feature Galaxy 
S4 
Galaxy  
S6 
iPhone 
SE 
Model 
Number 
SGH-i337 SM-G920P A1662 
Operating 
System 
Android 
v. 5.0 
Android  
v. 7.0 
iOS  
v. 11.4.1 
Storage 
Capacity 
16 GB 32 GB 32 GB 
Table 1: Smartphone Devices 
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The victim smartphones were selected based on the 
operating systems executed on the devices. The 
Android and iOS operating systems represent the two 
most popular smartphone operating systems at the time 
of the research [41]. The hijacker smartphone was 
selected based on its compatibility with the XRY 
forensic toolkit, which was used to extract a memory 
dump of the device’s internal memory. Several 
smartphones could have been used to fulfill these 
criteria and could have been used in the research. The 
decision to use these specific devices was based on 
author availability.  
The Medical Internet of Things (MIoT) devices 
used in this experiment includes an iHealth Smart 
glucometer, an iHealth Air oximeter, and a Nokia 
Body scale. Table 2 - MIoT Devices, presents an 
overview of these devices, their model numbers, and 
firmware versions. These devices were selected based 
on two reasons. First, all three MIoT devices include 
both an Android and iOS smartphone application, 
which can be executed on the victim and hijacker 
smartphones. Second, each MIoT device can store 
offline readings, when the user’s smartphone 
application is not available to ‘push’ the results to the 
smartphone interface. The MIoT devices include a 
specific smartphone application. For the glucometer, 
the application used was Gluco-Smart (v. 4.7 on both 
Android and iOS), for the oximeter, the application 
used was MyVitals (Android v. 3.8.1 and iOS v. 3.8), 
and for the scale, the application used was Health Mate 
(Android v. 3.5.4 and iOS v. 4.0.1). 
 
Device Name Model Number Firmware  
Smart 
Glucometer 
BG5 V. 6.0.0 
Air Oximeter PO3M V. 2.1.4 
Body Scale 03700546702341 V. 1751 
Table 2: MIoT Devices 
In preparation for the experiment, the victim and 
hijacker smartphones were ‘hard reset’ to remove any 
previous data. The purpose of the hard reset is to 
restore the factory settings on smartphones. Depending 
on the smartphone, either a Google or Apple account 
was then created on the smartphone to complete the 
initial setup. All default setup options were selected 
during this process. The following steps were then 
undertaken during the experiment, which involved the 
victim smartphones, the MIoT devices, and the 
hijacker smartphone: 
1. The victim smartphones were connected to a local 
wireless network for the experiment. This wireless 
network was used to access the Internet. Using the 
victim smartphone’s respective application store 
(i.e., Google Play and the Apple App Store), the 
MIoT smartphone applications were downloaded 
and installed on each of the victim smartphones. 
The default installation and security parameters 
were used to install the smartphone applications. 
2. The MIoT smartphone applications were executed 
on each victim smartphone, and test profile 
accounts were created for the experiment. These 
profile accounts used test information to complete a 
user profile, which included: first name, last name, 
date of birth, gender, and email address fields. 
Default settings were used to complete the profile 
creation on all three MIoT applications.   
3. After setting up each MIoT smartphone application, 
the user interface was used to ‘pair’ the victim 
smartphone with the corresponding MIoT device. 
This involved using the respective smartphone 
application to ‘search’ for the corresponding MIoT 
device. After the device was found, the application 
interface provided steps to confirm the ‘pairing’ of 
the MIoT devices with the victim smartphones. At 
this point, the smartphone applications were ‘ready’ 
to receive device readings from the MIoT devices. 
Both victim smartphones were then powered down.    
4. Each MIoT device was then used once a day for six 
days. The first three days involved undertaking 
readings using the device’s iOS application profile. 
The last three days involved undertaking readings 
using the device’s Android application profile. The 
medical information measured using each MIoT 
device was as follows: 
• Glucometer – blood sugar level  
• Oximeter – oxygen level and pulse 
• Scale – weight, body fat percentage, water 
percentage, pulse, bone weight, muscle weight, 
and the Body Mass Index value.  
The device reading, as displayed on the MIoT 
device interface, along with the date and time of 
each reading, was documented for later analysis.  
5. The Android hijacker smartphone was then 
connected to the wireless network to gain access to 
the Internet. The relevant MIoT applications were 
then installed on the hijacker’s smartphone, using 
the default installation and security parameters to 
complete the installation. The MIoT smartphone 
applications were executed on the hijacker 
smartphone, and test profile accounts were created 
for the experiment. After the profiles were created, 
the hijacker smartphone applications were used to 
‘search’ for the MIoT devices. When a MIoT 
device was found, an attempt was made to ‘pair’ the 
hijacker smartphone with the MIoT device. If the 
pairing was successful, the hijacker’s smartphone 
application was then prompted to ‘download’ any 
available offline readings. This process was 
repeated for all three MIoT applications.  
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6. Immediately after the hijacker smartphone 
attempted to ‘download’ the offline readings, the 
smartphone contents were scrutinized using a 
manual mobile phone forensics examination 
technique [42]. This involved examining the MIoT 
smartphone application interface to determine if the 
victim’s medical information was visible through 
the smartphone interface. The hijacker smartphone 
was then processed using MSAB’s XRY (version 
7.7) mobile forensic toolkit. The XRY toolkit was 
used to create a forensic extraction of the 
smartphone’s internal memory. A wizard provided 
instructions on how to prepare the device for the 
extraction. The hijacker’s smartphone internal 
memory was then read, and a memory dump was 
saved to a desktop folder on the forensic 
workstation. The overall process took 
approximately thirty-five minutes. 
7. The forensic extractions were loaded into XRY’s 
associated tool, XAMN (version 3.2), where the 
Android file system was reconstructed. Several 
digital forensic analysis techniques were then used 
to locate files and artifacts related to MIoT 
smartphone applications. These techniques 
included: string searching, text filtering, and 
browsing the respective file systems. 
The scope of this research is restricted in the 
following ways. The experiment was conducted in the 
United States (US) using devices that contain network 
software for carrier providers in the US. The MIoT 
devices used in the experiment were acquired through 
the manufacturer’s US-based website. The experiment 
focused on a specific version of the Android and iOS 
operating systems, specific versions of the MIoT 
smartphone applications, and a specific version of 
XRY and XAMN. Due to tool limitation, Android was 
the sole operating system used for the hijacking 
smartphone. The experiment was executed only once, 
on each victim smartphone, with only one hijacking 
smartphone device. It should also be noted that the 
primary researcher was both a participant and a 
researcher in the experiment.  
 
4. Results and Analysis  
 
This section presents an analysis of the hijacker and 
the MIoT device pairing, as well as the results of the 
manual and smartphone examinations. 
 
4.1 Pairing of MIoT Devices and Hijacker 
 
At a high-level, two of the MIoT devices (the 
glucometer and the oximeter) were successfully added 
to the hijacker’s profile. This holds true for both the 
Android and iOS profiles. Several observations were 
made during this pairing process. From the perspective 
of the glucometer, a hijacker can ‘pair’ the device with 
their smartphone. First, the hijacker is prompted to 
scan either white QR-coded or blue non-coded test 
strips (Figure 1), before they can add the glucometer to 
their profile. To bypass the above selection, a hijacker 
can select the “non-coded strip” selection option. Next, 
the hijacker is notified to confirm that the device is 
powered-on and prompts the hijacker to turn on 
Bluetooth capabilities on their smartphone. The 
hijacker can then scan for nearby devices and selects 
the glucometer by selecting the device name 
“BG5xxxxxx”, in the Bluetooth menu. This allows the 
hijacker to pair and connect their smartphone to the 
glucometer. 
 
Figure 1: Glucometer Strip Selection 
After the pairing was successful, the hijacker is 
presented with a screen, as shown in Figure 2, 
prompting the upload of offline readings from the 
victim glucometer.  
 
Figure 2: Glucometer Offline Readings 
In terms of the oximeter, the hijacker is again 
notified to confirm that the device is powered-on and 
prompted to turn on Bluetooth capabilities on their 
smartphone. The device setup guide then searches for 
an oximeter nearby and then prompts the hijacker to 
select any devices that have been found (Figure 3). A 
Bluetooth connection between the hijacker and the 
oximeter is established at this point. 
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Figure 3: Oximeter Device Selection 
The hijacker is then provided with the option to 
take a new reading with the device or to upload any 
offline data through the ‘Filter Data’ option, as shown 
in Figure 4. Selecting this option provides the hijacker 
with a list of all the offline readings that are currently 
stored on the oximeter device.  
 
 
Figure 4: Oximeter Offline Readings 
The scale is the only MIoT device requiring the 
hijacker to interact with the device physically, in order 
to ‘pair’ with the hijacker’s smartphone. For this 
device, the hijacker is required to push a button at the 
front of the scale to turn on ‘broadcast mode’. After the 
device is placed into this mode, the hijacker is notified 
that a scale has been detected and the smartphone 
application configures the device for use. However, 
even after the hijacker is notified that the scale has 
been successfully paired with the smartphone, they are 
not prompted to upload any offline readings from the 
device.  
 
4.2 Hijack Device Examination 
 
A summary of MIoT device recordings recovered 
from the hijacker smartphone is available in Table 3 – 
Summary of Results. Several observations are 
derivable from these results. The analysis of the 
hijacker smartphone confirmed initial observations: the 
smartphone did not ‘pair’ with the scale. As a result, no 
data from this MIoT device was visible on the 
hijacker’s smartphone interface, nor recovered from 
the smartphone’s memory using the forensic toolkit.  
However, an examination of the hijacker’s 
smartphone revealed that medical information from the 
glucometer and oximeter devices was recoverable. This 
information included both Android and iOS application 
profiles. Depending on the MIoT device, this 
information is visible in either the smartphone’s 
interface or the forensic extraction of the smartphone’s 
internal memory. This information confirms the initial 
assumption that the hijacker’s smartphone successfully 
‘paired’ with the glucometer and oximeter devices.  
 
OS 
Device/Reading 
Value D
a
y
 1
 
D
a
y
 2
 
D
a
y
 3
 
A
n
d
ro
id
 
Glucometer: 
Blood Sugar 
Timestamp 
 
M 
M 
 
M 
M 
 
M 
M 
Oximeter: 
Oxygen Level 
Pulse 
  Timestamp 
 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
Scale: 
Weight 
Body Fat 
Body Water 
Pulse 
Bone Weight 
Muscle Weight 
BMI 
Timestamp 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 X 
iO
S
 
Glucometer: 
Blood Sugar 
Timestamp 
 
M 
M 
 
M 
M 
 
M 
M 
Oximeter: 
Oxygen Level 
Pulse 
  Timestamp 
 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
 
✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
Scale: 
Weight 
Body Fat 
Body Water 
Pulse 
Bone Weight 
Muscle Weight 
BMI 
Timestamp 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 X 
 
Key: ✓ = Recovered using manual and forensic 
examination; M = Recovered using manual 
examination only; X = Not recovered using manual or 
forensic examination 
Table 3: Summary of Results 
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4.2.1 Manual Examination  
 
A manual examination of the smartphone revealed 
that the hijacker’s version of the Gluco-Smart and 
MyVitals applications contained medical information 
(i.e., device readings). Figure 5 – Glucometer Manual 
Examination and Figure 6 – Oximeter Manual 
Examination present the results of the manual 
examination of these applications. 
From the perspective of the glucometer, a hijacker 
can potentially, view readings taken using the device in 
the Gluco-Smart application. The information 
recovered from the victim’s glucometer includes the 
victim’s blood sugar level, along with the date and 
time of the acquired reading.  
 
 
Figure 5: Glucometer Manual Examination  
Similarly, the manual examination of the MyVitals 
application interface revealed that a hijacker could 
view device readings from the oximeter device. This 
application reports a victim’s pulse rate in beats per 
minute, oxygen level, and each readings timestamp. 
 
Figure 6: Oximeter Manual Examination  
4.2.2 Forensic Image Examination  
 
The analysis of the Android memory dumps 
revealed a variety of artifacts related to the Gluco-
Smart and MyVitals applications. Artifacts related to 
these applications can are located in different 
subfolders under the location /data/ data/ in the 
Android filesystem [16]. The location of specific 
artifacts varies depending on the application under 
investigation. Unless noted, all timestamps recovered 
from the Android forensic extractions are recorded as 
epoch timestamps. 
The MyVitals application creates a folder called 
iHealthMyVitals.V2, which is stored                 
in the following file path 
/data/data/iHealthMyVitals.V2. This 
folder contains artifacts related to the victim’s use of 
the Air pulse oximeter. Within the high-level folder, 
there is a Databases subfolder. This contains 
various SQLite databases of potential interest. A 
database called androidNin.db contains fifty-
seven (57) tables, including three tables of data 
relevant to the victim’s oximeter and the hijacker. A 
table called TB_Device contains information about 
the oximeter device, which has been subject to 
interactions with the hijacker smartphone. Information 
regarding the oximeter that is available in this table 
includes the model number, the firmware version, and 
the physical MAC address of the device. A second 
table, which contains information related to the victim 
oximeter, is called TB_Spo2OfflineResult. This 
table contains the actual hijacked readings that the 
victim undertook using the oximeter. Along with the 
oximeter reading result, a hijacker can also obtain the 
date and time the reading was acquired, the timezone 
where the reading was taken, along with the MAC 
address of the oximeter used by the victim.  
A final table of interest is called TB_UserInfo. 
This table contains information about the hijacker and 
is likely to be of interest to an incident handler or 
forensic investigator. This table contains the date of 
birth, gender, height, and weight information as 
provided by the hijacker when the hijacker’ MyVitals 
profile was created. In addition to the information in 
the database file, relevant information was also found 
in several Extensible Markup Language (XML) files. 
These XML files are stored in a subfolder called 
shared_prefs, under the iHealthMyVitals.V2 
parent folder. Within the shared_prefs, subfolder 
the following files and information can be recovered, 
related to the hijacker, their victim, and the interactions 
between their devices: 
• historyTime.xml – contains the MAC address 
and timestamp information regarding the last 
interaction between the hijacker’s smartphone 
device and MIoT device. 
• saveUserIDs.xml – contains the email 
addresses used by the hijacker to register their 
account with the iHealth service. 
• saveDeviceId.xml – contains a list of the 
MIoT devices, which the hijacker has successfully 
accessed using this specific account. This includes 
the MAC address of the victim devices.  
• sp_connect_times_file.xml – contains 
the number of times that the hijacker’s account has 
been used to access a specific MIoT device. This 
information includes the MAC address of the 
device and the number of previous connections. 
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• sp_user_region_host_info.xml – 
contains information about the hijacker including 
their application account access token, a hash of 
their password, along with the cloud host used to 
access the iHealth services.  
• device_id.txt.xml – contains the device 
Universal Unique Identifier (UUID) of the 
hijacker’s smartphone. 
The Gluco-Smart application creates a folder called 
jiuan.androidBg.start, which is stored under 
the location /data/data/jiuan.androidBg. 
start. This folder contains artifacts related to the 
victim’s use of the Smart glucometer. While a database 
called androidBG.db was recovered from a 
subfolder called Database within the high-level 
application folder, this database was encrypted. An 
analysis of the other database files in the subfolder did 
not reveal any information about the hijacker or the 
victim devices. However, various XML files stored in 
the shared_prefs subfolder provide detailed 
information about the hijacker and their activities. The 
following files and information can are recoverable 
from this subfolder: 
• USER_INFO.xml – the username (as an email 
address) and the smartphones’ UUID that is used to 
connect to the glucometer device.  
• sp_user_region_host_info.xml – 
contains the hijacker’s email information, along 
with the host used to access the iHealth services. 
• sp_last_update_TS.xml – contains the 
MAC address and timestamp information regarding 
the last interaction between the hijacker’s 
smartphone device and MIoT device, whose MAC 
address is listed. 
• sp_connect_times_file.xml – contains 
the number of times that the hijacker’s account has 
been used to access a specific MIoT device. This 
information includes the MAC address of the 
device and the number of previous connections. 
• saveDeviceIdTS.xml – contains a list of the 
MIoT devices, which the hijacker has successfully 
accessed using this specific account. This includes 
the MAC address of the victim devices. 
• device_id.txt.xml – contains the device 
UUID of the hijacker’s smartphone. 
 
4.3 Analysis Summary and Limitations 
 
The results described above can be used to provide 
answers to the research questions proposed in Section 
One. First, the analysis of the hijacker smartphone 
revealed that the hijacking attacks on the victim MIoT 
devices resulted in recoverable residual data on the 
hijacker’s smartphone.  
Second, the manual and forensic analysis of the 
hijacker smartphone revealed that victim MIoT device 
readings are recoverable through a hijacking attack. 
The results of the manual examination have shown that 
the hijacker’s smartphone application contains readings 
from two (glucometer and oximeter) out of the three 
victims MIoT devices. Moreover, the results from the 
forensic examination of the hijacker’s smartphone 
revealed that device readings from the oximeter are 
recoverable from databases stored on the smartphone.  
Third, in addition to recovering device readings, the 
hijacker smartphone also contains a variety of metadata 
related to the glucometer and oximeter. This metadata 
includes device model numbers, firmware versions, 
and MAC address information. While this information 
is recoverable using a forensic extraction of the 
hijacker’s smartphone, if the same smartphone has 
been ‘rooted,’ a hijacker could potentially recover this 
information using tools freely available on the Internet 
at no cost. This information would be useful to an 
attacker interested in potentially causing a denial of 
service attack against MIoT devices [43].  
While the results of the manual and forensic 
examination of the hijacker’s smartphone revealed 
information about the victim MIoT devices, minimal 
information about the victim is recovered from this 
experiment. However, previous research establishes 
that an attacker can identify high-level device data 
patterns based on residual data generated from a 
variety of smartphone applications [19]. As a result, if 
an attacker combines information about the victim 
from other smartphone applications, coupled with the 
intelligence gathered from the MIoT devices, high-
level data patterns are a possibility.  
The overall analysis of the data partially supports 
the hypothesis that MIoT devices are susceptive to 
hijacking attacks through their accompanying 
smartphone applications. The hypothesis statement is 
true for two out of the three MIoT devices evaluated in 
this research. This statement holds true for both the 
Android and iOS application profiles on these devices. 
The data intercepted by a potential attacker could be 
used to commit further attacks or augment user profile 
development.  
While the analysis demonstrates that it is possible 
to launch a hijacking attack against a MIoT device, the 
following assumptions and limitations must be 
acknowledged. First, it is assumed that the hijacker is 
within proximity to the MIoT device. This is required 
to maintain a Bluetooth connection. However, due to 
the mobility feature of MIoT devices, this is not 
implausible as victims may use these devices in public 
places such as airports, libraries and coffee shops. 
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Second, this method of attack is relevant while the 
device manufacturer does not implement a verification 
mechanism, such as the approach used in the scale. If 
physical access to the MIoT device is needed to enable 
a feature or to push a button, then the hijacking attack 
is invalided using the proposed attack model. Third, 
the attack model is successful because the victim is not 
prompted to confirm if a particular smartphone can 
connect and receive information from the MIoT 
device. If a manufacturer enables such a feature, the 
victim will be prompted that a malicious hijacker is 
attempting to connect to a device and the hijacker’s 
smartphone does not successfully ‘pair’ with the MIoT 
device.  
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
The amalgamation of the Internet of things (IoT) 
devices into medical scenarios creates an atmosphere 
that is conducive to a variety of attacks. The results of 
this proof of concept research support the hypothesis 
that medical IoT devices are susceptible to hijacking 
attacks. The data demonstrates that it is possible to 
launch a successful hijacking attack against a Medical 
IoT (MIoT) device. This attack, potentially, allows an 
attacker to gather information about the MIoT device 
user, as well as the device itself. This intelligence 
could then be combined with other smartphone data to 
develop detailed profiles about the individual, 
including the identification of potential health issues. 
Moreover, the intelligence gathered from a MIoT 
device could also be used to launch denial of service 
attacks against similar devices. Such attacks on 
medical devices can be especially problematic in an 
emergency scenario.  
Future research will examine several key areas. 
This research will expand to include diverse MIoT 
devices and associated smartphone applications. The 
focus of this experiment is to evaluate the results from 
this initial investigation on a larger scale. Further 
research also needs to examine MIoT smartphone 
applications from the perspective of multiple operating 
systems. Future work will explore the idea of 
automating the attacks described in this paper, along 
with other vulnerabilities in MIoT devices. This 
automation then allows for the development of a test 
environment that will assist with the interrogation of 
medical devices and the development of potential 
secure mitigation strategies.   
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